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Abstract
We construct an approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium for a
nonzero-sum differential game in the class of stochastic strategies with mem-
ory. The construction is based on a solution of an auxiliary nonzero-sum
continuous-time stochastic game. This class of games includes stochastic dif-
ferential games and continuous-time Markov games. Moreover, we study the
limit of approximate equilibrium outcomes in the case when the auxiliary
stochastic games tend to the original deterministic one. We show that it lies
in the convex hull of the set of equilibrium values provided by deterministic
punishment strategies.
Keywords: nonzero-sum differential games, approximate equilibrium, public-
signal correlated strategies, control with model.
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1 Introduction
The paper is concerned with approximate equilibria for two player differential
games. This problem is strongly connected with the theory of system of Hamilton–
Jacobi PDEs. It is proved that if the system of Hamilton–Jacobi PDEs admits a
classical solution, then this solution is a Nash value for the corresponding nonzero-
sum differential game [13]. Moreover, in this case one can construct a feedback Nash
equilibrium. This property is preserved in some cases when the system of Hamilton–
Jacobi PDEs admits only generalized solution (see [7], [10]). However, up to now
there is no existence theorem for the system of Hamilton–Jacobi PDEs. Moreover,
Bressan and Shen showed the ill-posedness of this system [8].
A different way to construct Nash equilibria for the nonzero-sum differential
game is based on so called punishment techniques. This approach guarantees the
existence of Nash equilibria [20], [23], [36]. Using punishment technique, one can
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characterize the set of all Nash equilibrium values in the class of deterministic strate-
gies [11], [20], [36]. Certainly, this set comprises the values corresponding to solutions
of Hamilton–Jacobi PDEs. However, within the punishment approach one can con-
struct equilibria those are realized only by incredible threats. A natural way to select
a proper Nash equilibrium is to restrict the attention to the so called Nash–Pareto
solution of nonzero-sum games [20]. Unfortunately, this solution concept does not
satisfy time consistency principle.
As it was mentioned in [8], there are two possibilities to overcome these difficul-
ties. The first way is to introduce some noise i.e. replace the original deterministic
system with the stochastic system. The second way is to introduce a cooperation.
In the paper we try to follow both ways. We assume that there exist an auxiliary
continuous-time stochastic game with the dynamics close to the original determinis-
tic one and a pair of functions satisfying a stability condition for the auxiliary game.
We use this pair of functions and a slight cooperation to construct an approximate
equilibrium in the original differential game. Note that the stability condition is
always satisfied if the pair of functions solves the system of Hamilton–Jacobi PDEs
for the auxiliary stochastic game.
We allow auxiliary continuous-time stochastic games with dynamics given by
generators of the Lévy-Khintchine type (see [21] for the general theory of generators
of the Lévy-Khintchine type). This class of games includes stochastic differential
games and continuous-time Markov games (i.e. games with the dynamics given by a
continuous-time Markov chain). Note that both aforementioned cases are well stud-
ied. The stochastic differential games were studied using a system of parabolic PDEs
in [4], [5], [14], [15], [18], [31], [32]. Another approach based on forward-backward
stochastic differential equations was developed for the stochastic differential games
in [17], [19], [29]. Punishment strategies were studied for this type of game in [9].
Note that approaches based on punishment and forward-backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations are equivalent (see [33]). The nonzero-sum Markov games were
studied in [30].
We assume that the players observe the state of the auxiliary stochastic system
and can use a memory. This leads to public-signal correlated equilibria in the class
of strategies with memory. The auxiliary stochastic game plays the role of a model
of the original nonzero-sum differential game. The control with model strategies
were first proposed for zero-sum differential games in [27]. They were applied to
construct approximate equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games (see [2]). In
those papers only deterministic models were allowed. The stochastic models for
zero-sum differential games were developed in [3], [24], [25], [26]. In the paper we
extend the mentioned results to the case of nonzero-sum differential games.
Note that, although the construction of public-signal strategies proposed in the
paper goes back to the ideas of punishment strategies, it allows to design approx-
imate equilibria based on the solution of the system of PDEs. We especially put
an attention to the case when the model of the game is determined by a stochastic
differential equation. In this case it is shown that one can construct an approximate
equailibrium based on a strong solution of the system of parabolic PDEs.
Additionally, we examine the limit of approximate equilibrium outcomes when
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the model stochastic games tend to the original deterministic one. It is shown that
any limit equilibrium outcome (that is a pair of numbers) lies in the convex hull of
the set of equilibrium values provided by deterministic punishment strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of
public-signal correlated approximate equilibria. The next section is concerned with
the formulation of the main result. It states that, given an auxiliary nonzero-sum
continuous-time stochastic game and a pair of continuous functions of position satis-
fying a stability condition for this auxiliary game, one can construct an approximate
equilibrium for the original game. In Section 4 we examine the link between the
systems of Hamilton–Jacobi PDEs and the proposed stability condition. First, we
consider the case of the auxiliary systems of the general form. It is proved that if
a pair of functions is a classical solution of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs,
then it satisfies the stability condition. Further, we study the special case when the
auxiliary system is determined by a stochastic differential equation. In this case we
show that if the pair of function is a generalized solution of the system of Hamilton-
Jacobi PDEs, then the stability condition is satisfied. Moreover, we present the
example demonstrating that the class of functions satisfying the stability condition
is not exhausted by the solutions of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs even in the
case of models given by stochastic differential equations. The limit of the approxi-
mate equilibrium outcomes is studied in Section 5. The other sections are concerned
with the proof of the main result. In Section 6, given a pair of functions satisfying
stability condition for the auxiliary continuous-time stochastic game, we construct
a profile of public-signal correlated strategies. Its properties are examined in Sec-
tion 7. Finally, Section 8 is devoted to the proof of the main result. To this end we
show that the profile of public-signal correlated strategies designed in Section 6 is
an approximate equilibrium.
2 Definitions and assumptions
We study the nonzero-sum differential game with the dynamics given by
x˙ = f1(t, x, u) + f2(t, x, v), t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U, v ∈ V. (1)
Here u (respectively, v) denotes the control of the first (respectively, second) player.
We assume that the purpose of the i-th player is to maximize the terminal payoff
γi(x(T )). Below we assume that U and V are metric compacts. To simplify notation
we will also use the following designation:
f(t, x, u, v) , f1(t, x, u) + f2(t, x, v). (2)
To define the notion of approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium let us
introduce some auxiliary definitions.
If Υ is a metric space, then denote by B(Υ) the corresponding Borel σ-algebra.
Set Fs,r , B(C([s, r];Rd)). Let D be a linear subspace of C2(Rd) containing C2b (Rd),
linear functions x 7→ 〈a, x〉 and quadratic functions x 7→ ‖x− a‖2.
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Informally, the concept of public-signal correlated strategies can be described as
follows. We assume that both players at each time observe the random signal that
is produced by an external device. Below this information will be a forecasting of
a state of a game being a stochastic model of the original game. The players form
their control using this shared information and the history of the game.
This idea can be formalized in the following way.
Definition 1. A 6-tuple w = (Ω,F , {F}t∈[t0,T ], ux(·), vx(·), Px(·)) is called a profile of
public-signal correlated strategies on [t0, T ] if
(i) (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[t0,T ]) is a measurable space with a filtration;
(ii) for each x(·) ∈ C([t0, T ];Rd), Px(·) is a probability on F ;
(iii) for each x(·) ∈ C([t0, T ];Rd), ux(·) (respectively, vx(·)) is a {Ft}t∈[t0,T ]-
progressively measurable process taking values in U (respectively, V );
(iv) if x(t) = y(t) for all t ∈ [t0, r], then
• for any A ∈ Fr, Px(·)(A) = Py(·)(A),
• for any t ∈ [t0, r], ux(·)(t) = uy(·)(t), vx(·)(t) = vy(·)(t) Px(·)-a.s.
(v) for any r, the restrictions of functions (x(·), t, ω) 7→ ux(·)(t, ω), (x(·), t, ω) 7→
vx(·)(t, ω) on C([t0, T ];R
d)× [t0, r]× Ω are measurable with respect to Ft0,T ⊗
B([t0, r])⊗ Fr;
(vi) for any A ∈ F , the function x(·) 7→ Px(·)(A) is measurable with respect to
Ft0,T .
Let us briefly comment this definition. First, it states that the choice of proba-
bility space is the part of the profile of strategies (condition (i)), whereas the prob-
ability of the random signal observed by the players depends on the sample path of
the game (condition (ii)). Further, we assume that the players’ controls are func-
tions of the random signal and the sample path of the game (see condition (iii)).
Moreover, conditions (iii) and (iv) mean that the random signal and the players’
controls depend on the sample path in the nonanticipative way. Conditions (v) and
(vi) are technical; they assure the measurable dependence of the players’ controls
and the probability of the shared signal on the history of the game.
The definition of the equilibrium involves unilateral deviations by the players.
Usually this means that the player changes only her control. However, Definition 1
states that the probability space is a part of the profile of strategies. Thus, it is
natural to allow the deviating player to choose her own probability space which can
also comprise the probability space coming from the original profile of strategies.
This lead to the following definition.
Definition 2. Given a profile of public-signal correlated strategies w =
(Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[t0,T ], Px(·), ux(·), vx(·)), we say that a profile of strategies wc =
(Ωc,F c, {F ct }t∈[t0,T ], P cx(·), ucx(·), vcx(·)) is an unilateral deviation by the first (re-
spectively, the second) player if there exists a filtered measurable space
(Ω′,F ′, {F ′}t∈[t0,T ]) such that
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(i) Ωc = Ω× Ω′;
(ii) F c = F ⊗F ′;
(iii) F ct = Ft ⊗ F ′t for t ∈ [t0, T ];
(iv) for any x(·) ∈ C([t0, T ];Rd) and any A ∈ F , P cx(·)(A× Ω′) = Px(·)(A);
(v) for any x(·), t ∈ [t0, T ], ω ∈ Ω, ω′ ∈ Ω′, vx(·)(t, ω, ω′) = vx(·)(t, ω) (respectively,
ux(·)(t, ω, ω
′) = ux(·)(t, ω)).
As above let us briefly comment this definition. Conditions (i)–(iii) means that
now the signal consists of two parts: the random signal produced in the original
strategy ω and the additional information ω′. Simultaneously, condition (iv) and (v)
states that if the player does not deviates, then she does not observe the additional
signal ω′. Notice that the public-signal profile of strategies is always a deviation
from itself.
Now let us introduce the motion generated by the public-signal correlated profile
of strategies.
Definition 3. Let t0 ∈ [0, T ], x0 ∈ Rd, w = (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[t0,T ], Px(·), ux(·), vx(·)) be a
profile of public-signal correlated strategies on [t0, T ]. We say that a pair (X(·), P )
is a realization of the motion generated by w and initial position (t0, x0) if
(i) P is a probability on F ;
(ii) X(·) is a {Ft}t∈[t0,T ]-adapted process taking values in Rd;
(iii) X(t0) = x0 P -a.s.;
(iv) for P -a.e. ω ∈ Ω,
d
dt
X(t, ω) = f1(t, X(t, ω), uX(·,ω)(t, ω)) + f2(t, X(t, ω), vX(·,ω)(t, ω)).
(v) Px(·) = P (·|X(·) = x(·)) i.e. given A ∈ F ,
P (A) =
∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
Px(·)(A)χ(d(x(·))),
where χ is a probability on C([t0, T ];R
d) defined by the rule: for any A ∈ Ft0,T ,
χ(A) , P{ω : X(·, ω) ∈ A}.
Below we say that the profile of strategies w is a profile of stepwise strategies
if there exists a partition ∆ = {tj}rj=0 of the time interval [t0, T ] such that the
equalities x(tj) = y(tj), j = 0, 1, . . . , r imply that
Px(·) = Py(·), ux(·) = uy(·), vx(·) = vy(·).
Note that if the profile of strategies w is stepwise, then, for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd,
there exists at least one realization.
5
For a given initial position (t0, x0) and a profile of public-signal correlated strate-
gies w, we can introduce upper and lower player’s outcomes by the following rules:
J+i (t0, x0,w) , sup{Eγi(X(T )) : (X(·), P ) generated by w and (t0, x0)},
J−i (t0, x0,w) , inf{Eγi(X(T )) : (X(·), P ) generated by w and (t0, x0)}.
Here E denotes the expectation according to the probability P .
Definition 4. We say that a profile of public-signal correlated strategies w∗ is a
public-signal correlated ε-equilibrium at the position (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd if, for any
profile of strategies wi that is an unilateral deviation from w∗ by the player i, the
following inequality holds true:
J+i (t0, x0,w
i) ≤ J−i (t0, x0,w∗) + ε.
To construct a public-signal correlated ε-equilibrium we use a solution of an
auxiliary stochastic game with a dynamics determined by a generator of the Lévy-
Khintchine type Λt[u, v]. The general theory of such stochastic processes described
by generator of the Lévy-Khintchine type is presented in [22]. Assume that, for each
t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U , v ∈ V , Λt[u, v] is an operator from D to C(Rd) defined by the rule:
(Λt[u, v]φ)(x) ,
1
2
〈G(t, x, u, v)∇,∇〉φ(x) + 〈b(t, x, u, v),∇〉φ(x)
+
∫
Rd
[φ(x+ y)− φ(x)− 〈y,∇φ(x)〉1B1(y)]ν(t, x, u, v, dy). (3)
Here B1 stands for the ball of radius 1 centered at the origin; for each t ∈ [0, T ],
x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U , v ∈ V , G(t, x, u, v) is a nonnegative symmetric d × d-matrix,
b(t, x, u, v) is a d-dimensional vector, ν(t, x, u, v, ·) is a measure on Rd such that
ν(t, x, u, v, {0}) = 0.
Remark 1. Let us briefly explain the meaning of the coefficients in (3). Here b
stands for the deterministic evolution, G is a squared diffusion coefficient, whereas
ν(t, x, u, v, ·) denotes the intensity of jumps. To illustrate this let us consider two
examples. First, assume that the stochastic process Y (t) is determined by the
controlled stochastic differential equation
dY (t) = b(t, Y (t), u(t), v(t))dt+ σ(t, Y (t), u(t), v(t))dWt.
In this case G(t, x, u, v) = σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v), ν(t, x, u, v, dy) ≡ 0.
Now, let us consider the pure jump processes. In this case (3) takes the form
(Λt[u, v]φ)(x) =
∫
Rd
[φ(x+ y)− φ(x)]ν(t, x, u, v, dy).
This case can be interpreted as follows. Given the state x, the value
ν(t, x, u, v,Rd)dt + o(dt) is a probability of the jump from x on [t, t + dt], whereas
ν(t, x, u, v,Υ)/ν(t, x, u, v,Rd) + o(dt) is a probability of transition to Υ if the jump
takes place.
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Furthermore, we assume that the objective function of the player i in the auxil-
iary stochastic game is equal to
E
[
γi(X(T )) +
∫ T
t0
hi(t, X(t), u(t), v(t))dt
]
. (4)
Denote
Σ(t, x, u, v) , trG(t, x, u, v) +
∫
Rd
‖y‖2ν(t, x, u, v, dy), (5)
g(t, x, u, v) , b(t, x, u, v) +
∫
Rd\B1
yν(t, x, u, v, du). (6)
We assume that the following conditions hold true:
(L1) U , V are metric compacts;
(L2) f1, f2 G, b, γ1, γ2, h1, h2 are continuous and bounded;
(L3) for any φ ∈ D, the function [0, T ] × Rd × U × V ∋ (t, x, u, v) 7→∫
Rd
φ(y)ν(t, x, u, v, dy) is continuous.
(L4) there exists a function α(·) : R → [0,+∞) such that α(δ) → 0 as δ → 0 and,
for any t, s ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x, u, v)− f(s, x, u, v)‖ ≤ α(t− s),
‖g(t, x, u, v)− g(s, x, u, v)‖ ≤ α(t− s);
(L5) there exists a constant M such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤ M, ‖g(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤M ;
(L6) there exists a constant K > 0 such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x′, x′′ ∈ Rd, u ∈ U ,
v ∈ V ,
‖f(t, x′, u, v)− f(t, x′′, u, v)‖ ≤ K‖x′ − x′′‖,
‖g(t, x′, u, v)− g(t, x′′, u, v)‖ ≤ K‖x′ − x′′‖;
(L7) there exists a constant R > 0 such that, for any x′, x′′ ∈ Rd, i = 1, 2,
|γi(x′)− γi(x′′)| ≤ R‖x′ − x′′‖;
(L8) for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
|Σ(t, x, u, v)| ≤ δ2,
‖f(t, x, u, v)− g(t, x, u, v)‖2 ≤ 2δ2,
|hi(t, x, u, v)| ≤ δ.
In condition (L8) δ is a small parameter.
7
3 Approximate equilibrium and stability condition
The main result of the paper involves a pair of functions (c1, c2) satisfying a sta-
bility property (see Condition (C) below). Roughly speaking one can consider (c1, c2)
as value function of the nonzero-sum continuous-time stochastic game with the dy-
namics determined by the generator Λt[u, v] and objective functions of the players
given by (4). The link between this stability property and system of Hamilton-Jacobi
PDEs is given in Section 4. To formulate the stability condition we introduce the
notion of controlled system admissible for the generator Λt[u, v]. This notion uses
the relaxed stochastic control of both players first introduced in [34].
Denote the set of probabilities on a Polish space Υ by rpm(Υ). We endow rpm(Υ)
with the narrow topology i.e. {χn}∞n=1 ⊂ rpm(Υ) converges to χ ∈ rpm(Υ) iff, for
any φ ∈ Cb(Υ) ∫
Υ
φ(υ)χn(dυ)→
∫
Υ
φ(υ)χ(dυ) as n→∞.
This space is Polish [6], [38]. Moreover, rpm(Υ) is compact when Υ is compact.
The mapping z 7→ δz provides a natural embedding of Υ into rpm(Υ). Hereinafter
δz stands for the Dirac measure concentrated at z.
A stochastic process taking values in rpm(U) (respectively, in rpm(V )) is a re-
laxed stochastic control of the first (respectively, second) player. Furthermore, the
stochastic process taking values in rpm(U × V ) is a relaxed stochastic controls of
both players. If µ(t) (respectively, ν(t)) is a relaxed control of the first (respectively,
second player), we write µ(t, du) (respectively, ν(t, dv)) instead of µ(t, ω)(du) (re-
spectively, ν(t, ω)(dv)). Analogously, if η(t) is a relaxed control of both players, we
write η(t, d(u, v)) for η(t, ω)(d(u, v)).
Now let us introduce the notion of controlled system going back to [12], [16]. This
notion generalize the standard notion of deterministic controlled system. The main
difference is that in the stochastic case we assume that the control and the motion
of the system are stochastic processes defined on some filtered probability space,
when the dynamics is determined by solution of martingale problem (see condition
(iv) of Definition 5 below).
Definition 5. Let s, r ∈ [0, T ], s < r. We say that a 6-tuple
(Ω,F , {F}t∈[s,r], P, η,X) is a controlled system on [s, r] admissible for the gener-
ator Λt[u, v] if
(i) (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[s,r], P ) is a filtered probability space;
(ii) η is a {Ft}t∈[s,r]-progressively measurable stochastic process taking values in
rpm(U × V );
(iii) X is a {Ft}t∈[s,r]-adapted stochastic process taking values in Rd;
(iv) for any φ ∈ D, the process
φ(X(t))−
∫ t
s
∫
U×V
(Λτ [u, v]φ)(X(τ))η(τ, d(u, v))dτ
is a {Ft}t∈[s,r]-martingale.
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The following stability condition plays a key role in the construction of the
approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium.
Definition 6. Let c1, c2 : [0, T ] × Rd → R be continuous functions. We say that
the pair (c1, c2) satisfies Condition (C) if, for any s, r ∈ [0, T ], s < r, there exists a
filtered measurable space (Ω̂s,r, F̂ s,r, {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r]) satisfying the following properties:
(i) given y ∈ Rd, one can find processes ηs,ry , Ŷ s,ry and a probability P̂ s,ry such
that the 6-tuple (Ω̂s,r, F̂ s,r, {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P̂ s,ry , ηs,ry , Ŷ s,ry ) is a control system ad-
missible for Λt[u, v] and, for i = 1, 2,
Ê
s,r
y
[
ci(r, Ŷ
s,r
y (r)) +
∫ r
s
∫
U×V
hi(t, Ŷ
s,r
y (t), u, v)η
s,r
y (t, d(u, v))dt
]
= ci(s, y);
(ii) for any y ∈ Rd and v ∈ V , one can find a relaxed stochastic control of the
first player µs,ry,v, a process Y
1,s,r
y,v taking values in R
d and a probability P
1,s,r
y,v
such that the 6-tuple (Ω̂s,r, F̂ s,r, {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P 1,s,ry,v , µs,ry,v⊗ δv, Y
1,s,r
y,v ) is a control
system admissible for Λt[u, v] and
E
1,s,r
y,v
[
c2(r, Y
1,s,r
y,v (r)) +
∫ r
s
∫
U
h2(t, Y
1,s,r
y,v (t), u, v)µ
s,r
y,v(t, du)dt
]
≤ c2(s, y);
(iii) given y ∈ Rd and u ∈ U , one can find a second player’s relaxed stochastic
control νs,ry,u, a process Y
2,s,r
y,u and a probability P
2,s,r
y,u such that the 6-tuple
(Ω̂s,r, F̂ s,r, {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P 2,s,ry,u , δu ⊗ νs,ry,u, Y 2,s,ry,u ) is a control system admissible
for Λt[u, v] and
E
2,s,r
y,u
[
c1(r, Y
2,s,r
y,u (r)) +
∫ r
s
∫
V
h1(t, Y
2,s,r
y,u (t), u, v)ν
s,r
y,u(t, dv)dt
]
≤ c1(s, y).
Here Ês,ry (respectively, E
1,s,r
y,u , E
2,s,r
y,u ) denotes the expectation according to the prob-
ability P̂ s,ry (respectively, P
1,s,r
y,u , P
2,s,r
y,u ).
Informally speaking, the meaning of Condition (C) is as follows. The first part of
this condition means that both players can maintain the value (c1(s, y), c2(s, y))
on the time interval [s, r] choosing an appropriate controlled stochastic system.
Parts (ii), (iii) mean that if player i picks a constant control on [s, r], then the
other player can find a controlled system such that the outcome of the player i on
[s, r] is not greater than ci(s, y). Here we assume that the terminal part of the i-th
player’s reward on [s, r] is given by ci(r, ·). Additionally, to avoid technical issues we
assume that all mentioned controlled systems exploit the same filtered measurable
space. Notice that Condition (C) is an extension of the notion of u-stability first pro-
posed in [27] to examine zero-sum differential games. The variant of Condition (C)
for the case when Λt[u, v] is given only by deterministic evolution was considered
in [2].
9
Further, let
β , (5 + 2K), (7)
C , 2
√
TeβT . (8)
Theorem 1. Let continuous functions c1, c2 : [0, T ]× Rd → R be such that
• ci(T, x) = γi(x);
• (c1, c2) satisfies Condition (C).
Then, for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd, and ε > (RC + T )δ, there exists a profile of
public-signal correlates strategies w∗ that is ε-equilibrium at (t0, x0). Moreover, if
X∗ and P ∗ are generated by w∗ and (t0, x0), E
∗ denotes the expectation according to
P ∗, then
|E∗γi(X∗(T ))− ci(t0, x0)| ≤ ε.
To prove this Theorem we introduce the profile of stepwise public-signal cor-
related strategies in Section 6. The construction involves an auxiliary stochastic
processes those can be regarded as models of the original game. The properties of
these models are examined in Section 7. They play the crucial role in the proof of
Theorem 1 that is presented in Section 8.
4 System of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs
In this section we specify Condition (C) and provide a link between this condition
and a system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs. First, we consider the case when the dy-
namics of the auxiliary system is given by the generator of the general form. For this
case we prove that if c1, c2 is a classical solution to the system of Hamilton-Jacobi
equations, then it satisfies Condition (C). Additionally, we consider the specific case
when the dynamics of the auxiliary system is determined by the stochastic differen-
tial equation. In this case we prove that if (c1, c2) is the generalized (strong) solution
of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, then Condition (C) holds.
Theorem 2. Assume that the functions c1, c2 : [0, T ]×Rd → R, u0 : [0, T ]×Rd → U ,
v0 : [0, T ]× Rd → V satisfy the following conditions:
1. the functions c1, c2 are of the class C
2;
2. for i = 1, 2,
∂ci
∂t
+ Λt[u
0(t, x), v0(t, x)]ci(t, x) + hi(t, x, u
0(t, x), v0(t, x)) = 0,
ci(T, x) = γi(x).
(9)
3.
Λt[u
0(t, x), v0(t, x)]ci(t, x) + hi(t, x, u
0(t, x), v0(t, x))
= max
u∈U
[
Λt[u, v
0(t, x)]ci(t, x) + hi(t, x, u, v
0(t, x))
]
, (10)
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Λt[u
0(t, x), v0(t, x)]ci(t, x) + hi(t, x, u
0(t, x), v0(t, x))
= max
v∈V
[
Λt[u
0(t, x), v]ci(t, x) + hi(t, x, u
0(t, x), v)
]
. (11)
4. given [s, r] ∈ [0, T ], s < r, there exist solutions of the martingale problems on
[s, r] for the generators Λt[u
0(t, ·), v0(t, ·)], Λt[u, v0(t, ·)], Λt[u0(t, ·), v], u ∈ U ,
v ∈ V ; moreover, one can find a common filtered measurable space with a
filtration suitable for all mentioned problems.
Then, the pair (c1, c2) satisfies Condition (C). In particular, for any (t0, x0) ∈
[0, T ]×Rd, ε > (RC + T )δ, there exists the public-signal correlated ε-equilibrium at
(t0, x0).
Remark 2. Notice that (9) is a system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs corresponding to
the generator Λt[u, v] and objective functions (4), whereas equations (10), (11) mean
that u0(t, x) and v0(t, v) are Nash equilibrium feedback strategies.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let (Ω˜s,r, F˜ s,r, {F˜ s,rt }t∈[s,r]) be a filtered measurable space suit-
able for the solution of the martingale problems for the generators Λt[u
0(t, ·), v0(t, ·)],
Λt[u, v
0(t, ·)], Λt[u0(t, ·), v]. Put Ω̂s,r , Ω˜s,r, F̂ s,r , F˜ s,r, F̂ s,rt , F˜ s,rt . Furthermore,
given y ∈ Rd, let P˜ 0,s,ry , Y˜ 0,s,ry be such that (Ω˜s,r, F˜ s,r, {F˜ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P˜ 0,s,ry , Y˜ 0,s,ry )
solves the martingale problem for the generator Λt[u
0(t, ·), v0(t, ·)] and initial po-
sition (s, y). Set P̂ s,ry , P˜
0,s,r
y , Ŷ
s,r
y , Y˜
0,s,r
y , η
s,r
y (t) , δu0(t,Y˜ 0,s,ry (t)) × δv0(t,Y˜ 0,s,ry (t)).
Using the standard dynamical programming arguments, one can prove that the part
(i) of Condition (C) is fulfilled.
To prove the second part of Condition (C) use the dynamic programming prin-
ciple and (9), (10) letting P
1,s,r
y,v , P˜
1,s,r
y,v , Y
1,s,r
y,v , Y˜
1,s,r
y,v , µ
s,r
y,v(t) , δu0(t,Y 1,s,ry,v (t))
. Here
P˜ 1,s,ry,v and Y˜
1,s,r
y,v are, respectively, a probability on F˜ s,r and a stochastic process
defined on Ω˜s,r such that (Ω˜s,r, F˜ s,r, {F˜ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P˜ 1,s,ry,v , Y˜ 1,s,ry,v ) solves the martingale
problem for the generator Λt[u
0(t, ·), v] and initial position (s, y).
The third part is proved in the same way.
Now let us restrict the attention to the case when the auxiliary system is given
by the controlled stochastic differential equation
dX(t) = b(t, X(t), u(t), v(t))dt+ σ(t, X(t), u(t), v(t))dW (t) (12)
where W (t) stands for the m-dimensional Wiener process and σ : [0, T ]×Rd ×U ×
V → Rd×m. This corresponds to the generator
Λt[u, v]φ(x) =
1
2
〈G(t, x, u, v)∇,∇〉φ(x) + 〈b(t, x, u, v),∇〉φ(x),
with G(t, x, u, v) = σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v). Thus, system (9) is now the system of
second order PDEs:
∂ci
∂t
+
1
2
〈G(t, x, u0(t, x), v0(t, x))∇,∇〉ci(t, x)
+〈b(t,x, u0(t, x), v0(t, x)),∇〉ci(t, x) + hi(t, x, u0(t, x), v0(t, x)) = 0,
ci(T, x) = γi(x).
(13)
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However, to apply Theorem 2 directly to system (12) we are to assume that
system (13) admits a classical solution. That is rather restrictive assumption. For
the case when σ does not depend on u and v this assumption can be weakened. This
result is proved by the dynamic programming arguments. It is a counterpart of [15,
Theorem 17.2.1], [18, Theorem 4.1], [31, Theorem 4.1], [32, Theorem 3.6].
We assume that the dynamics of the auxiliary system is determined by the
stochastic differential equation of the following form:
dX(t) = b(t, X(t), u(t), v(t))dt+ σ(t, X(t))dW (t). (14)
This system corresponds to the generator
Λt[u, v]φ(x) = 〈b(t, x, u, v),∇φ(x)〉+ 1
2
〈G(t, x)∇,∇φ(x)〉, (15)
where G(t, x) = σ(t, x)σT (t, x).
We will study the link between the generalized solution of the system of parabolic
equation corresponding to the game with dynamics (15) and condition (C) under
the following additional assumptions:
(A1) W (t) is a d-dimensional Wiener process, σ is d× d-matrix;
(A2) there exists a constant C0 > 0 such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, C−10 I ≤
G(t, x) ≤ C0I;
(A3) σ is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. x;
(A4) there exist measurable functions uN(t, x, p1, p2), v
N(t, x, p1, p2) taking values
in U and V respectively such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x, p1, p2 ∈ Rd, u ∈ U ,
v ∈ V .
H1(t, x, p1, uN(t, x, p1, p2), vN(t, x, p1, p2)) ≥ H1(t, x, p1, u, vN(t, x, p1, p2)),
H2(t, x, p2, uN(t, x, p1, p2), vN(t, x, p1, p2)) ≥ H2(t, x, p2, uN(t, x, p1, p2), v).
Here I stands for the identity matrix, whereas
Hi(t, x, p, u, v) , 〈pb(t, x, u, v)〉+ hi(t, x, u, v).
Notice that now the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equation is the following system
of parabolic equations:
∂ci
∂t
+Hi(t, x,∇ci, uN(t, x,∇c1,∇c2), uN(t, x,∇c1,∇c2))
+ 〈G(t, x)∇,∇〉ci(t, x) = 0.
(16)
ci(T, x) = gi(x). (17)
This system is a variant of (13) with u0(t, x) = uN(t, x,∇c1(t, x),∇c2(t, x)),
v0(t, x) = vN(t, x,∇c1(t, x),∇c2(t, x)).
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As it was mentioned above, we consider strong generalized solutions of sys-
tem (16). This solution concept relies on the following definitions. Let Υ be a
subset of [0, T ] × Rd. Denote by H1+κ(Υ) the set of functions ϕ : Υ → R those
satisfy Hölder condition for the exponent κ with its derivatives w.r.t. spatial vari-
ables. Further, let W 1,2q (Υ) be the set of functions ϕ : Υ → R such that ϕ ∈ Lq(Υ)
and there exist generalized derivatives ∂ϕ/∂t, ∂ϕ/∂xi, ∂
2ϕ/∂xi∂xj which belong to
Lq(Υ).
Definition 7. The pair (c1, c2) is a strong solution of (16), (17) if
1. c1, c2 ∈ L∞([0, T ]× Rd);
2. for any bounded Ξ ⊂ Rd, and some κ ∈ (0, 1), q > d+2, c1, c2 ∈ H1+κ([0, T ]×
cl(Ξ)) ∩W 1,2q ((0, T )× Ξ);
3. (16) holds almost everywhere in (0, T )× Ξ, (17) is fulfilled in Ξ.
Note that any classical solution of (16), (17) is a strong solution.
Remark 3. There are several papers dealing with the link between the value functions
of the stochastic differential games and strong solutions of the system of parabolic
PDEs. Let us mention only [5], [13], [18], [31], [32]. In particular, for the case of
stochastic differential games on the bounded domain of Rd it is proved that if the
functions uN and vN are continuous w.r.t. pi, there exists a strong solution of the
corresponding system of parabolic PDEs that provides the Nash equilibrium in the
stochastic differential game [15] (see, also, [4], [5]). The case when the strategies
are not continuous was studied in [32] under some additional assumptions. Several
existence results for system (16), (17) were obtained in [18]. These results covers
the cases when
• the drift is bounded whereas uN , vN are continuous w.r.t. adjoint variables;
• the drifts and the running rewards of the players have a separate structure
whereas the strategies uN , vN are merely measurable.
Theorem 3. Let the auxiliary stochastic system be given by (14). Assume that
conditions (A1)–(A4) hold. If c1, c2 is a strong generalized solution of (16), (17),
then (c1, c2) satisfies condition (C) for generator Λ given by (15).
Proof. Let us fix s, r ∈ [0, T ], s < r. We put (Ω̂s,r, F̂ s,r, {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P̂ s,r) to be
the standard probability space carrying the d-dimensional Wiener process on [s, r].
Note that here we assume that the probabilities P̂ s,r do not depend on the initial
state y. Moreover, we set P
1,s,r
y,v = P
2,s,r
y,u , P̂
s,r.
Let R > 0. Denote by BR the ball centered at the origin of the radius R.
Since ci ∈ H1+κ([s, r] × BR), for each i = 1, 2, one can construct a function c∇i,R :
[0, T ]×Rd → Rd, that is Hölder continuous with the exponent κ on [0, T ]×Rd and
coincides with ∇ci on [0, T ]× BR. Denote
b∗R(t, x) , b(t, x, u
N(t, x, c∇1,R(t, x), c
∇
2,R(t, x)), v
N(t, x, c∇1,R(t, x), c
∇
2,R(t, x))).
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Under condition (A1)–(A4) it follows from [37] there exists a stochastic process Ŷ s,ry,R
solving the stochastic differential equation
dŶ s,ry,R = b
∗
R(t, Ŷ
s,r
y,R)dt+ σ(t, Ŷ
s,r
y,R)dWt, Ŷ
s,r
y,R = y.
Put
ηs,ry , δuN (t,c∇1,R(t,Ŷ
s,r
y,R),c
∇
2,R(t,Ŷ
s,r
y,R))
⊗ δvN (t,c∇1,R(t,Ŷ s,ry,R),c∇2,R(t,Ŷ s,ry,R)).
We have that, for any φ ∈ D,
φ(Ŷ s,ry,R(t))−
∫ t
s
∫
U×V
Λτ [u, v]φ(Ŷ
s,r
y,R(t))η
s,r
y,R(τ, d(u, v))dτ (18)
is a {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r]-martingale. Recall that for the considered case the generator Λ is
given by (15).
If ̺ ∈ [0, R], then denote by Θs,r̺,R the exit time of Ŷ s,ry,R from [s, r]× B̺. Clearly,
Θs,r̺,R = Θ̺,̺ and, for t ∈ [s,Θs,r̺,R],
Ŷ s,ry,R = Ŷ
s,r
y,̺ .
Further, let Ŷ s,ry and η
s,r
y be limits of Ŷ
s,r
y,R and η
s,r
y,R respectively when R→∞. Taking
the limit in (18), we get that (Ω̂s,r, F̂ s,r, {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P̂ s,r, Ŷ s,ry , ηs,ry ) is an admissible
control system for the generator Λ given by (15).
Let Θs,r̺ be the first exit time of Ŷ
s,r
y from [s, r]×B̺. We have that, for t ∈ [s,Θs,r̺ ]
and any R ≥ ̺, Ŷ s,ry = Ŷ s,ry,R. Additionally, notice that Θs,r̺ converges to r as ̺→∞.
By Ito-Krylov formula [28, Theorem 2.10.1] we have that
Ê
s,r
∫ Θs,r̺
s
([
∂
∂t
+ 〈b∗(t, Ŷ s,ry (t)),∇〉+ 〈G(t, Ŷ s,ry (t))∇,∇
]
ci(t, Ŷ
s,r
y (t))
)
dt
= Ês,rci(Θ
s,r
̺ , Ŷ
s,r
y (Θ
s,r
̺ ))− ci(s, y).
(19)
Here
b∗(t, x) , b(t, x, uN(t,∇c1(t, x),∇c2(t, x)), vN(t,∇c1(t, x),∇c2(t, x)))
is the limit of b∗R(t, x) when R→∞.
Taking into account the definition of Hi, we get that
Ê
s,r
∫ Θs,r̺
s
([ ∂
∂t
+ 〈b∗(t, Ŷ s,ry (t)),∇〉+〈G(t, Ŷ s,r(t))∇,∇
]
ci(t, Ŷ
s,r
y (t))
)
dt
= Ês,r
∫ Θs,r̺
s
[
Hi(t, Ŷ s,ry (t),∇c1(t, Ŷ s,ry (t)),∇c2(t, Ŷ s,ry (t)))
+〈G(t, Ŷ s,ry (t))∇,∇ci(t, Ŷ s,ry (t))〉
]
dt
−Ês,r
∫ Θs,r̺
s
∫
U×V
hi(t, Ŷ
s,r
y (t), u, v)η
s,r
y (t, d(u, v))dt.
(20)
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Since (c1, c2) is a solution of (16) and Ŷ
r,s
y has a density, (19), (20), we get
Ê
s,r
[
ci(Θ
s,r
̺ , Ŷ
s,r
y (Θ
s,r
̺ )) +
∫ Θs,r̺
s
∫
U×V
hi(t, Ŷ
s,r
y (t), u, v)η
s,r
y (t, d(u, v))dt
]
= ci(s, y).
(21)
Since Θs,r̺ → r as ̺→∞, we conclude that part (i) of Condition (C) is fulfilled.
Parts (ii) and (iii) are proved in the same. Let us briefly describe the proof of
part (ii). Fix y ∈ Rd and v ∈ V . As above, we construct the processes µs,ry,v and
Y
1,s,r
y,v such that
• µs,ry,v = δuN (t,Y 1,s,ry,v (t),∇c1(t,Y 1,s,ry,v (t)),∇c2(t,Y 1,s,ry,v (t)));
• for any ϕ ∈ D,
φ(Y
1,s,r
y,v (t))−
∫ t
s
∫
U
Λτ [u, v]φ(Y
1,s,r
y,v (τ))µ
s,r
y,v(τ, du)
is a {F̂ s,rt }-martingale.
Let Θ1,s,ry,v,̺ be the first exit time of Y
1,s,r
y,v from [s, r] × B̺. As above we use the
Ito-Krylov formula [28, Theorem 2.10.1] and get
Ê
s,r
∫ Θs,r̺
s
([
∂
∂t
+ 〈b1v(t, Ŷ 1,s,ry (t)),∇〉+ 〈G(t, Ŷ 1,s,ry (t))∇,∇
]
c2(t, Ŷ
s,r
y (t))
)
dt
= Ês,rc2(Θ
1,s,r
̺ , Ŷ
s,r
y (Θ
1,s,r
̺ ))− c2(s, y).
(22)
Here we denote b1v(t, x) , b(t, x, u
N(t, x,∇c1(t, x),∇c2(t, x)), v). By condition (A4)
using the same arguments as above, we get that
c2(t, y) ≥ Ês,r
[
c2(t, Y
s,r
y,v(Θ
1,s,r
̺ )) +
∫ Θ1,s,r̺
s
∫
U
h2(t, Y
s,r
y,v(t), u, v)µ
s,r
y,v(t, du)dt
]
.
This proves part (ii) of Condition (C).
The following example is an illustration of Theorem 3.
Example 1. Let d = 1, f(t, x, u, v) = f˜1(t, x)u + f˜2(t, x)v + f˜3(t, x), u, v ∈ [−1, 1].
Choose h1(t, x, u, v) , −δu2/2, h2(t, x, u, v) , −δv2/2. Finally, set σ(t, x) , δ. In
this case uN(t, x, p1, p2) = ⌈p1f˜1(t, x)/δ⌉, vN(t, x, p1, p2) = ⌈p2f˜2(t, x)/δ⌉, where we
denote
⌈a⌉ ,

a, |a| ≤ 1
1, a ≥ 1,
−1, a ≤ −1.
Thus, (16) takes the form
∂ci
∂t
+
∂ci
∂x
(⌈ f˜1(t, x)
δ
∂c1
∂x
⌉
+
⌈ f˜2(t, x)
δ
∂c2
∂x
⌉
+ f˜3(t, x)
)
− δ
2
⌈ f˜i(t, x)
δ
∂ci
∂x
⌉2
+
δ2
2
∂2ci
∂x2
= 0, i = 1, 2.
(23)
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This system has a strong solution [18, Theorem 3.1]. Theorem 1 provides that, given
a solution of (23) one can construct an approximate equilibrium for the original
nonzero-sum differential game. However, system (23) is highly nonlinear even in the
simplest cases and can be solved only numerically.
The following example shows that the class of functions satisfying condition (C)
is not limited by the solutions of the system of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs.
Example 2. Consider the following controlled system
x˙1 = u, x˙2 = v, t ∈ [0, 1], u, v ∈ [−1, 1].
Assume that γ1(x1, x2) = ζx1 − x2, γ2(x1, x2) = ζx2 − x1. Here ζ ∈ (0, 1/2). Now
let us introduce the auxiliary stochastic system. Put b = f , σ = δI (here I stands
for the identity matrix), h1 = h2 = 0. We have that (16) takes the form
∂ci
∂t
+
∂ci
∂x1
· sgn
( ∂c1
∂x1
)
+
∂ci
∂x2
· sgn
( ∂c2
∂x2
)
+
δ2
2
(∂2ci
∂x21
+
∂2ci
∂x22
)
= 0. (24)
At the same time boundary condition (17) takes the form
c1(1, x1, x2) = ζx1 − x2, c2(1, x1, x2) = ζx2 − x1. (25)
It is easy to check that the functions c11(t, x1, x2) = ζx1 − x2 − (1 − ζ)(1 − t),
c12(t, x1, x2) = ζx2 − x1 − (1− ζ)(1− t) solve system (24), (25).
Now let us consider the smooth functions c21(t, x1, x2) = ζx1−x2+(1− ζ)(1− t),
c22(t, x1, x2) = ζx2−x1+(1−ζ)(1−t). They do not solve system (24), (25). However,
the pair (c21, c
2
2) satisfies condition (C). Indeed, the auxiliary stochastic system in
the example is
dY (t) = (u(t) + v(t))dt+ δW (t). (26)
Here W (t) is the 2-dimensional Wiener process. Let s, r ∈ [0, 1], s < r.
Put (Ω̂s,r, F̂ s,r, {F̂ s,rt }t∈[s,r], P̂ s,r) be the standard probability space carrying the 2-
dimensional Wiener process on [s, r]. Further, we assume that P̂ s,r does not depend
on initial state y and the probabilities P
1,s,r
y,v , P
2,s,r
y,u are equal to P̂
s,r.
To show that part (i) of Condition (C) is fulfilled choose y = (y1, y2) and pick
u = v = −1. Thus, the 2-dimensional process with the components Ŷ s,r1,y (t) =
y1− (t− s)+W1(t− s), Ŷ s,r2,y (t) = y2− (t− s) +W2(t− s) satisfies (26). Here W1(t),
W2(t) are components of the Wiener processes W (t). We have that
Ê
s,rc2i (r, Ŷ
s,r
1,y (r), Ŷ
s,r
2,y (r)) = ζyi − y3−i + (1− ε)(r − s) + (1− ε)(1− r)
= ζyi − y3−i + (1− ζ)(1− s) = c2i (s, y1, y2).
Hence, part (i) of condition (C) is fulfilled for (c21, c22). Notice that in this case
ηs,ry (t) = δ−1 ⊗ δ−1. Now, let v be an arbitrary element of [−1, 1]. Pick u = 1. We
have that Y
1,s,r
1,y,v = y1+ (t− s) +W1(t− s), Y 1,s,r2,y,v = y2 + v(t− s) +W2(t− s) satisfy
(26). We have that
Ê
s,rc22(r, Y
1,s,r
1,y,v, Y
1,s,r
2,y,v) = ζy2 − y1 + ζv(r− s)− (r − s) + (1− ζ)(1− r)
= ζy2 − y1 + (1− ζ)(1− s)− (r − s)(2− (v + 1)ζ)
≥ c22(s, y1, y2).
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Thus, part (ii) of condition (C) holds. Here µs,ry,v(t) = δ1. Analogously, picking
Y
2,s,r
1,y,u = y1 + u(t − s) +W1(t − s), Y
2,s,r
2,y,u = y2 + (t − s) +W2(t − s), we get that
Ê
s,rc1(r, Y
2,s,r
1,y,v, Y
2,s,r
2,y,v) ≥ c1(s, y1, y2). This proves part (iii) of condition (C).
5 Limit of ε-equilibria
In this section we compare the result presented in the paper with the approach
to Nash equilibria based on the framework of punishment strategies (see [11], [20],
[23], [36]). The main purpose of this section is to prove that the limit of ε-Nash equi-
libria constructed by Theorem 1 provides the Nash value in the class of punishment
strategies.
Let Vali denote the value function of the zero-sum differential game with the
dynamics (1) where the i-th player wishes to maximize her terminal payoff γi(x(T ))
and the other player wishes to minimize this outcome. One can assume that the
players use deterministic strategies with memory. In this case the strategy of the first
(respectively, second) player is a family of functions from [t0, T ] to U u• = {ux(·)}
defined for all x(·) ∈ C([t0, T ],Rd) such that if x(t) = y(t) for all t ∈ [t0, θ], then
ux(·)(t) = uy(·)(t). Analogously, a strategy with memory of the second player is a
family of functions v• = {vx(·)}x(·)∈C([t0,T ],Rd) satisfying the property: the equality
x(t) = y(t) for all t ∈ [t0, θ] implies that vx(·)(t) = vy(·)(t) for t ∈ [t0, θ]. It suffices
to consider only stepwise strategies. This means that there exists a partition of the
time interval [t0, T ] ∆ = {tj}mj=0 such that if x(tj) = y(tj), then ux(·)(t) = uy(·)(t)
(respectively, vx(·)(t) = vy(·)(t)). Denote the set of stepwise strategies with mem-
ory on [t0, T ] of the first (receptively, second) player by U[t0] (respectively, V[t0]).
Further, let U [t0] (respectively, V[t0]) denote the set of all measurable functions
u : [t0, T ] → U (respectively, v : [t0, T ] → V ). If t0 ∈ [0, T ], x0 ∈ Rd, u• ∈ U[t0],
v ∈ V[t0], then denote by x1(·, t0, x0, u•, v) a solution of the initial value problem:
d
dt
x(t) = f 1(t, x(t), ux(·)(t)) + f
2(t, x(t), v(t)), x(t0) = x0. (27)
One can prove the existence and uniqueness result for (27).
Analogously, for u ∈ U [t0], v• ∈ U[t0], let x2(·, t0, x0, u, v•) solve the initial value
problem:
d
dt
x(t) = f 1(t, x(t), u(t)) + f 2(t, x(t), vx(·)(t)), x(t0) = x0.
It follows from [27], [35] that
Val1(t0, x0) = sup
u•∈U[t0]
inf
v∈V [t0]
γ1(x
1(T, t0, x0, u•, v)),
Val2(t0, x0) = sup
v•∈V[t0]
inf
u∈U [t0]
γ2(x
2(T, t0, x0, u, v•)).
Moreover, [35, Theorem 13.3] implies that, for any compact G ⊂ Rd, and ε > 0,
there exists strategies uG,ε• ∈ U[t0], vG,ε• ∈ V[t0] such that, for any x0 ∈ G, t0 ∈ [0, T ],
Val1(t0, x0) ≥ inf
v∈V [t0]
γ1(x
1(T, t0, x0, u
G,ε
• , v))− ε,
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Val2(t0, x0) ≥ inf
u∈U [t0]
γ2(x
2(T, t0, x0, u, v
G,ε
• ))− ε.
Now, we turn to the nonzero-sum differential game with the dynamics given
by (1) and players’ payoffs determined by γi(x(T )). We consider Nash equilibria for
this game within deterministic memory strategies as defined in [20], [36]. For the
sake of shortness, we recall only the characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs.
The precise definition of equilibrium in the class of deterministic memory strategy
and the proof of characterization theorem can be found in [11], [20], [36].
Definition 8. We say that (a1, a2) ∈ R2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t0, x0) if
there exists a function x(·) ∈ C([t0, T ];Rd) solving
d
dt
x(t) = co{f1(t, x(t), u) + f2(t, x(t), v) : u ∈ U, v ∈ V }, x(t0) = x0 (28)
such that ai = γi(x(T )) ≥ Vali(t, x(t)) for any t ∈ [t0, T ].
We denote the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs at (t0, x0) by N (t0, x0). Each
set N (t0, x0) is closed.
Theorem 4. For each natural n, let Λnt [u, v] be a generator of the Lévy-Khintchine
type
(Λnt [u, v]φ)(x) ,
1
2
〈Gn(t, x, u, v)∇,∇〉φ(x) + 〈bn(t, x, u, v),∇〉φ(x)
+
∫
Rd
[φ(x+ y)− φ(x)− 〈y,∇φ(x)〉1B1(y)]νn(t, x, u, v, dy).
Additionally, let hni , i = 1, 2, n ∈ N, be a function from [0, T ] × Rd × U × V to
R. Assume that Λnt [u, v] and h
n
i satisfy conditions (L1)–(L8) for δ = δ
n. Further,
let (cn1 , c
n
2 ) satisfy boundary condition c
n
i (T, x) = γi(x) and Condition (C) with the
generator Λnt [u, v] and running payoffs h
n
i . If
δn → 0, (cn1(t0, x0), cn2(t0, x0))→ (a1, a2) as n→∞,
then (a1, a2) ∈ coN (t0, x0).
Proof. Denote εn , 2(RC + T )δn. By Theorem 1, for each n, there exists a public-
signal correlated profile of strategies wn = (Ωn,Fn, {Fn}t∈[t0,T ], unx(·), vnx(·), P nx(·)) that
is εn-equilibrium at (t0, x0). Let X
n(·) and P n be generated by wn and initial
position (t0, x0).
Let us introduce the probability χn on C([t0, T ];R
d) by the following rule: if A
is a Borel subset of C([t0, T ];R
d), then
χn(A) , P n{ω ∈ Ωn : Xn(·, ω) ∈ A}.
Further, let S(t0, x0) denote the set of solution of (28). Notice that
• supp(χn) ⊂ S(t0, x0);
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• any x(·) in S(t0, x0) is Lipschitz continuous with the constant M and satisfies
the initial condition x(t0) = x0.
Thus, by [6] we get that {χn} is relatively compact with respect to the narrow
convergence. Without loss of generality, we can assume that there exists a probabil-
ity on C([t0, T ];R
d) χ such that {χn}∞n=1 converges narrowly to χ. Note that each
motion x(·) from supp(χ) satisfies (28).
Further, by construction of χn we have that
E
nγi(X
n(T )) =
∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
γi(x(T ))χ
n(d(x(·))). (29)
Here En denotes the expectation according to the probability P n. By Theorem 1
and (29) we get ∣∣∣∣∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
γi(x(T ))χ
n(d(x(·)))− cni (t0, x0)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ εn.
Passing to the limit when n→∞, we conclude that∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
γi(x(T ))χ(d(x(·))) = ai. (30)
For a ∈ R, let a+ denote a ∨ 0. Now, we shall prove that∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
∫ T
t0
[Vali(t, x(t))− γi(x(T ))]+dtχ(d(x(·))) = 0. (31)
First, we claim that, for any τ ∈ [t0, T ],∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
[Vali(τ, x(τ))− γi(x(T ))]+χ(d(x(·))) = 0. (32)
Indeed, assume for definiteness that∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
[Val1(τ, x(τ))− γ1(x(T ))]+χ(d(x(·))) = 3ρ > 0.
Since the function x(·) 7→ [Val1(τ, x(τ))− γ1(x(T ))]+ is continuous, and the proba-
bilities χ, χn are concentrated on the compact S(t0, x0), there exists a number N0
such that, for all n > N0,∫
C([0,T ];Rd)
[Val1(τ, x(τ))− γ1(x(T ))]+χn(d(x(·))) ≥ 2ρ > 0. (33)
Moreover, one can assume that, for n > N0,
εn < ρ. (34)
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Further, notice that∫
C([0,T ];Rd)
[Val1(τ, x(τ))− γ1(x(T ))]+χn(d(x(·)))
=En[Val1(τ,X
n(τ))− γi(Xn(T ))]+.
Denote by Ξnτ the set of ω ∈ Ωn such that
Val1(τ,X
n(τ, ω)) ≥ γ1(Xn(T, ω)).
Let wn,τ,ρ = (Ωn,Fn, {Fnt }t∈[t0,T ], un,τ,ρx(·) , vnx(·), P nx(·)) be the deviation by the first
player from wn with
un,τ,ρx(·) (t, ω) ,

unx(·)(t, ω), t ∈ [t0, T ], ω /∈ Ξnτ ,
t ∈ [t0, τ), ω ∈ Ξnτ ,
u
G(τ),ρ
x(·) , t ∈ [τ, T ], ω ∈ Ξnτ .
Here G(τ) = {x(τ) : x(·) ∈ S(t0, x0)}, and uG(τ),ρ• is the first player’s strategy that
is ρ-optimal for the zero-sum differential game with the dynamics given by (1) and
objective function γ1(x(T )) at any position from G(τ).
Let Xn,τ,ρ(·) and P n,τ,ρ be generated by wn,τ,ρ and (t0, x0). Furthermore, let
E
n,τ,ρ be the expectation according to P n,τ,ρ. We have that, for ω ∈ Ωn \ Ξnτ ,
Xn,τ,ρ(·, ω) = Xn(·, ω). Moreover if ω ∈ Ξnτ , then Xn,τ,ρ(t, ω) = Xn(t, ω) for t ∈
[t0, τ ] and γ1(X
n,τ,ρ(T, ω)) ≥ Val1(τ,Xn(τ))− ρ. This and (33) imply the inequality
E
n,τ,ργ1(X
n,τ,ρ(T )) = En,τ,ργ1(X
n,τ,ρ(T ))1Ωn\Ξnτ + E
n,τ,ργ1(X
n,τ,ρ(T ))1Ξnτ
≥ Enγ1(Xn(T ))1Ωn\Ξnτ + EnVal1(τ,Xn(τ))1Ξnτ − ρ
≥ Enγ1(Xn(T )) + 2ρ− ρ.
Since εn < ρ (see (34)), we get that wn is not a public-signal correlated εn-
equilibrium. This contradicts with the choice of wn. Thus, (32) is fulfilled.
Further, let m be a natural number, for k = 0, . . . , m, and let τmk , t0 + (T −
t0)k/m. Recall that, for any x(·) ∈ S(t0, x0),
‖x(t′)− x(t′′)‖ ≤M |t′ − t′′|.
Additionally, the function Vali is Lipschitz continuous. Thus, there exists a con-
stant C1 such that, for any x(·) ∈ S(t0, x0), any t′, t′′ ∈ [0, T ],
|Vali(t′, x(t′))− Vali(t′′, x(t′′))| ≤ C1|t′ − t′′|.
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Since χ is concentrated on S(t0, x0), we have that∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
∫ T
t0
[Vali(t, x(t))− γi(x(T ))]+dtχ(d(x(·)))
=
m∑
k=1
∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
∫ τmk
τm
k−1
[Vali(t, x(t))− γi(x(T ))]+dtχ(d(x(·)))
≤
m∑
k=1
∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
∫ τmk
τm
k−1
[Vali(τ
m
k−1, x(τ
m
k−1))− γi(x(T ))]+dtχ(d(x(·)))
+
m∑
k=1
∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
∫ τmk
τm
k−1
|Vali(t, x(t))−Vali(τmk−1, x(τmk−1))|dtχ(d(x(·)))
=
(T − t0)
m
m∑
k=1
∫
C([t0,T ];Rd)
[Vali(τ
m
k−1, x(τ
m
k−1))− γi(x(T ))]+χ(d(x(·)))
+ C1
(T − t0)
2m
.
Using (32), we get that
0 ≤
∫
C([0,T ];Rd)
∫ T
t0
[Vali(t, x(t))− γi(x(T ))]+dtχ(d(x(·))) ≤ C1 (T − t0)
2m
.
Passing to the limit when m→∞, we get (31).
This implies that, for χ-a.e. x(·), (γ1(x(T )), γ2(x(T ))) is a Nash equilibrium
value. Using (30), we obtain the conclusion of the Theorem.
6 Construction of near equilibrium strategies
The aim of this section is to construct a profile of public-signal correlated strate-
gies w∗ for a given initial position (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd and any partition of the time
interval [t0, T ]. Below (see Sections 7 and 8) we show that w
∗ is an approximate
equilibrium at (t0, x0). This will prove Theorem 1.
First, for t ∈ [0, T ], x, y ∈ Rd, let u♮, u♮ : [0, T ] × Rd × Rd → U , v♮, v♮ : [0, T ] ×
R
d × Rd → V be measurable functions satisfying
u♮(t, x, y) ∈ Argmin{〈x− y, f1(t, x, u)〉 : u ∈ U}, (35)
u♮(t, x, y) ∈ Argmax{〈x− y, f1(t, x, u)〉 : u ∈ U}, (36)
v♮(t, x, y) ∈ Argmin{〈x− y, f2(t, x, v)〉 : v ∈ V }, (37)
v♮(t, x, y) ∈ Argmax{〈x− y, f2(t, x, v)〉 : v ∈ V }.
The existence of these functions follows from the Kuratowski–Ryll-Nardzewski se-
lection theorem [1, Theorem 18.13].
For θ ∈ R, put
α˜(θ) ,
4
3
M
√
1 + (M)2eT/2
√
|θ|, (38)
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ǫ(θ) , 2(M)2θ + 2α˜(θ) + 2(α(θ))2 + (KM)2θ2 + (K)2α˜(θ)θ + (K)2θ. (39)
Recall that the pair of functions (c1, c2) satisfies Condition (C) (see Definition 6).
Let (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd be an initial position, and let ∆ = {tk}nk=0 be a partition
of the time interval [t0, T ]. The position (t0, x0) and the partition ∆ are parameters
for the profile of strategies w∗ defined below. However, we do not indicate the
dependence of the profile of strategies on them assuming that (t0, x0) and ∆ are
fixed.
Denote by d(∆) the fineness of ∆. Let the filtered measurable space
(Ω̂tk−1,tk , F̂ tk−1,tk , {F̂ tk−1,tkt }t∈[tk−1,tk ]), families of probabilities P̂ tk−1,tky , P
1,tk−1,tk
y,v ,
P
2,tk−1,tk
y,u and families of stochastic processes Ŷ
tk−1,tk
y , Y
1,tk−1,tk
y,v , Y
2,tk−1,tk
y,u , η
tk−1,tk
y ,
µ
1,tk−1,tk
y,v , ν
2,tk−1,tk
y,u be chosen according to Condition (C) for s = tk−1, r = tk. Below,
Ê
tk−1,tk
y , E
1,tk−1,tk
y,v , E
2,tk−1,tk
y,u state for the expectations according to the probabilities
P̂
tk−1,tk
y , P
1,tk−1,tk
y,v , P
2,tk−1,tk
y,u respectively.
Denote
Ψk(x, y) , Êtk−1,tky
∥∥∥x− Ŷ tk−1,tky (tk)∥∥∥2 . (40)
Now let us define the public-signal correlated profile of strategies w∗ =
(Ω∗,F∗, {F∗t }t∈[t0,T ], u∗x(·), v∗x(·), P ∗x(·)) by the following rules.
First, set
Ω∗ ,
n×
k=1
(Ω̂tk−1,tk)3,
F∗ ,
n⊗
k=1
(F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk).
If t ∈ [tk−1, tk], then put
F∗t ,
[
k−1⊗
j=1
(
F̂ tj−1,tjtj ⊗ F̂
tj−1,tj
tj ⊗ F̂
tj−1,tj
tj
)]
⊗
(
F̂ tk−1,tkt ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tkt ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tkt
)
⊗
[
n⊗
j=k+1
(
F̂ tj−1,tjtj−1 ⊗ F̂
tj−1,tj
tj−1 ⊗ F̂
tj−1,tj
tj−1
)]
.
Notice that the elements of Ω∗ are 3n-tuples ω = (ω01, ω
1
1, ω
2
1, . . . , ω
0
n, ω
1
n, ω
2
n).
Informally speaking, (ω01, . . . , ω
0
n) corresponds to the case when both players use the
Nash equilibrium strategies; (ω11, . . . , ω
1
n) is used when the second players deviates,
whereas (ω21, . . . , ω
2
n) works when the first player changes her strategy.
To define the probability Px(·), and the processes ux(·), vx(·) let us introduce
auxiliary continuous-time stochastic processes Y 0, Y 1x(·), Y
2
x(·) by the following rules:
• Y 0(t0) = Y 1x(·)(t0) = Y 2x(·)(t0) , x0;
• if Y 0(t), Y 1x(·)(t) and Y 2x(·)(t) are already defined on [t0, tk−1], then set, for
t ∈ [tk−1, tk],
Y 0(t) , Ŷ
tk−1,tk
Y 0(tk−1)
(t); (41)
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• if, for all j = 1, . . . , k,
Ψj(x(tj), Y
0(tj−1)) ≤ ‖x(tj−1)− Y 0(tj−1)‖2(1 + β(tj − tj−1))
+ (4δ2 + ǫ(tj − tj−1)) · (tj − tj−1), (42)
then, for t ∈ [tk−1, tk], put Y 1x(·)(t) = Y 2x(·)(t) , Y 0(t);
• if inequality (42) violates for some j = 1, . . . , k, then define the processes
Y 1x(·)(t), Y
2
x(·)(t) on [tk−1, tk] by the rule:
Y 1x(·)(t) , Y
1,tk−1,tk
Y 1
x(·)
(tk−1),v♮(tk−1,x(tk−1),Y
1
x(·)
(tk−1))
(t),
Y 2x(·)(t) , Y
2,tk−1,tk
Y 2
x(·)
(tk−1),u♮(tk−1,x(tk−1),Y
2
x(·)
(tk−1))
(t).
For t ∈ [tk−1, tk), set
u∗x(·)(t) , u♮(tk−1, x(tk−1), Y
1
x(·)(tk−1)),
v∗x(·)(t) , v♮(tk−1, x(tk−1), Y
2
x(·)(tk−1)). (43)
To complete the definition of the profile of strategies w∗ it remains to introduce
the probability P ∗. To this end, we let us define the sequences of auxiliary σ-algebra
{Gk}nk=0 and auxiliary probabilities {Pk,x(·)}nk=0 by the following rules.
Put
Gk ,
[
k⊗
j=1
(F̂ tj−1,tjtj ⊗ F̂
tj−1,tj
tj ⊗ F̂
tj−1,tj
tj )
]
⊗ {∅,Γk} ,
where
Γk ,
n×
j=k+1
(Ω̂tj−1,tj )3.
Formally, we assume that G0 = {∅,Ω∗}.
One can check that the random variables Y 0(tk) and Y
i
x(·)(tk), i = 1, 2, are Gk
measurable. Moreover, Gk ⊂ F∗tk and Gn = F∗T = F∗
The probability P0,x(·) is defined on G0 in the trivial way.
Further, assume that Pk−1,x(·) is already defined. Note that there exists a func-
tion pk,x(·) : (F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk) × Ω∗ → [0, 1] satisfying by the following
properties:
• for any ω ∈ Ω∗, pk,x(·)(·, ω) is a probability on F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk ;
• for any B ∈ F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk , the function ω 7→ pk,x(·)(B, ω) is
Gk−1-measurable;
• if B0, B1, B2 ∈ F̂ tk−1,tk , ω ∈ Ω∗, then
pk,x(·)(B
0 × B1×B2, ω)
=P̂
tk−1,tk
Y 0(tk−1,ω)
(B0)P̂
tk−1,tk
Y 1(tk−1,ω)
(B1)P̂
tk−1,tk
Y 2(tk−1,ω)
(B2)
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in the case when (42) is fulfilled for all j = 1, . . . , k and
pk,x(·)(B
0 × B1 ×B2, ω)
= P̂
tk−1,tk
Y 0(tk−1,ω)
(B0) · P 1,tk−1,tkY 1(tk−1,ω),v♮(tk−1,x(tk−1),Y 1(tk−1,ω))(B1)
· P 2,tk−1,tkY 2(tk−1,ω),u♮(tk−1,x(tk−1),Y 2(tk−1,ω))(B2)
when (42) violates for some j = 1, . . . , k.
For
A ∈
k−1⊗
j=1
(
F̂ tj−1,tj ⊗ F̂ tj−1,tj ⊗ F̂ tj−1,tj
)
, B ∈ F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk ⊗ F̂ tk−1,tk ,
put
Pk,x(·) (A× B × Γk) ,
∫
A×Γk−1
pk,x(·)(B, ω)Pk−1,x(·)(dω).
Pk,x(·) is extended to the whole σ-algebra Gk in the standard way. It is easy to
check that the restriction of Pk,x(·) on Gk−1 coincides with Pk−1,x(·).
To complete the definition of the probability P ∗x(·) observe that Gn = F∗ and set
P ∗x(·) , Pn,x(·).
Let us clarify the meaning of the processes Y 0, Y 1x(·), Y
2
x(·). They play the role of
models of the game. The process Y 0 is used when the both players behave according
to w∗, whereas Y 1x(·) (respectively, Y
2
x(·)) works when the second (respectively, first)
player deviates.
7 Properties of the models of the game
First, let us consider the case when both players form their control according to
the profile of strategies w∗. Let X∗(·), P ∗ be generated by w∗ and (t0, x0). Denote
by E∗ the expectation according to P ∗. For i = 1, 2, let Y∗,i(t) , Y iX∗(·)(t). Further,
denote by η0k the stochastic process with values in rpm(U × V ) defined by the rule:
η0k(t) , η
tk−1,tk
Y 0(tk−1)
(t). (44)
Notice that, for any φ ∈ D, the process
φ(Y 0(t))−
∫ t
tk−1
Λτ [u, v]φ(Y
0(τ))η0k(τ, d(u, v))dτ (45)
is a {F∗t }t∈[tk−1,tk]-martingale.
Lemma 1. The following statements hold true:
1. Y 0(t) = Y∗,1(t) = Y∗,2(t) for t ∈ [t0, T ];
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2. for k = 1, . . . , n,
E
∗(‖X∗(tk)− Y 0(tk)‖2|F∗tk−1)
≤ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2(1 + β(tk − tk−1))
+(4δ2 + ǫ(tk − tk−1)) · (tk − tk−1).
(46)
Proof. The proof is close to the proof of [3, Lemma 14].
First, assume that, for j = 0, . . . , k − 1,
Y 0(tj) = Y∗,1(tj) = Y∗,2(tj) (47)
Thus, on each time interval [tk−1, tk] the process X
∗ is F∗tk−1-measurable. Notice
that, for t ∈ [tk−1, tk], the following condition holds in the almost sure sense:
d
dt
X∗(t) = f(t, X∗(t), u♮(t, X
∗(tk−1), Y
0(tk−1)), v♮(t, X
∗(tk−1), Y
0(tk−1))).
We have that, for t ∈ [tk−1, tk],
‖X∗(t)−X∗(tk−1)‖ ≤M(t− tk−1) P ∗-a.s. (48)
Assuming that δ ≤ 1, using that (45) is {F∗t }t∈[tk−1,tk]-martingale for any φ ∈ D,
and conditions (L5), (L8), one can prove that
E
∗(‖Y 0(t)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2|F∗tk−1) ≤ δ2(t− tk−1) + α˜(t− tk−1) · (t− tk−1), (49)
where α˜(·) is defined by (38). The proof of (49) is similar to the proof of [3,
Lemma 13].
Since ‖X∗(tk) − Y 0(tk)‖2 = ‖(X∗(tk) − X∗(tk−1)) − (Y 0(tk) − Y 0(tk−1)) +
(X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1))‖2, we have that
E
∗(‖X∗(tk)− Y 0(tk)‖2|F∗tk−1) = ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2
+ E∗(‖X∗(tk)−X∗(tk−1)‖2|F∗tk−1) + E∗(‖Y 0(tk)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2|F∗tk−1)
+ 2E∗(〈X∗(tk)−X∗(tk−1), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉|F∗tk−1)
− 2E∗(〈Y 0(tk)− Y 0(tk−1), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉|F∗tk−1)
− 2E∗(〈X∗(tk)−X∗(tk−1), Y 0(tk)− Y 0(tk−1)〉|F∗tk−1)
≤ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2
+ 2E∗(〈X∗(tk)−X∗(tk−1), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉|F∗tk−1)
− 2E∗(〈Y 0(tk)− Y 0(tk−1), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉|F∗tk−1)
+ 2E∗(‖X∗(tk)−X∗(tk−1)‖2|F∗tk−1) + 2E∗(‖Y 0(tk)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2|F∗tk−1).
(50)
Since (45) is a martingale for any φ ∈ D, using the definitions of the generator
Λt[u, v] and the function g (see (3) and (6) respectively), we get that
E
∗(〈Y 0(tk)− Y 0(tk−1), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)|F∗tk−1)〉 =
E
∗
(∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
Λt[u, v]lY 0(tk−1),X∗(tk−1)(Y
0(t))η0k(t, d(u, v))dt
∣∣∣F∗tk−1)
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Here we denote
lz1,z2(x) , 〈x− z1, z2 − z1〉.
Since
Λt[u, v]lz1,z2(x) = 〈g(t, x, u, v), z2 − z1〉,
we conclude that
E
∗(〈Y 0(tk)− Y 0(tk−1), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)|F∗tk−1)〉 =
E
∗
(∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
〈g(t, Y 0(t), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉η0k(t, d(u, v))dt|F∗tk−1
)
.
(51)
To simplify notation, put
uˆk , u♮(s,X
∗(tk−1), Y
0(tk−1)), vˆk , v♮(s,X
∗(tk−1), Y
0(tk−1)). (52)
Note that uˆk and vˆk are random variable measurable w.r.t. F∗tk−1 .
Combining (48), (49), (50) and (51), we get
E
∗(‖X∗(tk)− Y 0(tk)‖2|F∗tk−1)
≤ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2 + 2(M)2(r − s)2 + 2δ2(r − s)
+2α˜(r − s) · (r − s) + 2
∫ r
s
〈f(t, X∗(t), uˆk, vˆk), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉dt
−2E∗
(∫ tk
tk−1
〈g(t, Y 0(t), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉η0k(t, d(u, v))dt|F∗tk−1
)
.
(53)
Further, from conditions (L4), (L6) and estimate (48) we conclude that the following
inequality is fulfilled P ∗-a.s.:
〈f(t, X∗(t), uˆk, vˆk), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉
≤ 〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉
+ α(tk − tk−1)‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖
+K‖X∗(t)−X∗(tk−1)‖ · ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖
≤ 〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉
+
1
2
(α(tk − tk−1))2 + (K)
2
2
‖X∗(t)−X∗(tk−1)‖2
+ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2
≤ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2
+ 〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉
+
1
2
(α(tk − tk−1))2 + (KM)
2
2
(tk − tk−1)2.
(54)
Analogously, condition (L4), (L6) and inequality (49) imply the following estimate
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for all u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
−E∗(〈g(t,Y 0(t), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉∣∣F∗tk−1)
≤ −E∗(〈g(tk−1, Y 0(tk−1), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉∣∣F∗tk−1)
+ α(t− s)‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖
+K‖Y 0(t)− Y 0(tk−1)‖ · ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖
≤ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2
− E∗(〈g(tk−1, Y 0(tk−1), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉∣∣F∗tk−1)
+
(K)2
2
δ2(tk − tk−1) + 1
2
α(tk − tk−1))2
+
(K)2
2
α˜(tk − tk−1) · (tk − tk−1).
(55)
Inequalities (53), (54), (55) yield the estimate
E
∗(‖X∗(tk)− Y 0(tk)‖2|F∗tk−1)
≤ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2(1 + 4(tk − tk−1))+2δ2(tk − tk−1)
+2
∫ tk
tk−1
〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉dt−
−2E∗
(∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
〈g(tk−1, Y 0(tk−1), u,v),
X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉η0k(t, d(u, v))dt|F∗tk−1
)
+ǫ(tk − tk−1) · (tk − tk−1) ,
(56)
where the function ǫ is defined by (39).
From conditions (L6) and (L8) it follows that, for any u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk)− g(tk−1, Y 0(tk−1), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉
≤ 〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk)− g(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉
+K‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2
≤ 〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk)− f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉
+
(
K +
1
2
)
‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2 + δ2.
Using (35), (37) and (52), we get that, for all u ∈ U , v ∈ V ,
〈f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), uˆk, vˆk)− f(tk−1, X∗(tk−1), u, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)〉 ≤ 0.
This and (56) imply
E
∗(‖X∗(tk)− Y 0(tk)‖2|F∗tk−1) ≤ ‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2(1 + β(tk − tk−1))
+ 4δ2(tk − tk−1) + ǫ(tk − tk−1) · (tk − tk−1)
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where β is defined by (7). Hence, assumption (47) implies (46) for given k = 0, . . . , n.
Thus, by construction of the profile of strategies w∗ under assumption (47) the
equality Y 0(t) = Y∗,1(t) = Y∗,2(t) holds true for t ∈ [tk−1, tk].
To complete the proof it suffices to recall that Y 0(t0) = Y∗,1(t0) = Y∗,2(t0) =
X∗(t0) = x0 and use the induction.
Lemma 1 and the fact that X∗(t0) = Y
0(t0) = x0 immediately imply the follow-
ing.
Corollary 1.
E∗‖X∗(T )− Y 0(T )‖2 ≤ 4δ2TeβT + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT .
Now let w1 be an unilateral deviation from w∗ by the first player. This means
(see Definition 2) that w1 is a 6-tuple (Ω1,F1, {F1}t∈[t0,T ], u1x(·), v1x(·), P 1x(·)) such that,
for some filtered measurable space (Ω′,F ′, {F ′}t∈[t0,T ]), the following properties hold
true:
• Ω1 = Ω∗ × Ω′;
• F1 = F∗ ⊗ F ′;
• F1t = F∗t ⊗ F ′t;
• for any x(·) ∈ C([t0, T ];Rd) and any A ∈ F∗, P 1x(·)(A× Ω′) = P ∗x(·)(A);
• for any x(·) ∈ C([t0, T ];Rd), t ∈ [t0, T ], ω ∈ Ω∗, ω′ ∈ Ω′, vx(·)(t, ω, ω′) =
v∗x(·)(t, ω).
Let X1 and P 1 be generated by w1 and (t0, x0). Below E
1 stands for the expec-
tation according to P 1. Denote
Y ♮,2(t) , Y 2X1(·)(t). (57)
For t ∈ [tk−1, tk], put
S2k(t) , Y
2,tk−1,tk
Y♮,2(tk−1),u♮(tk−1,X1(tk−1),Y♮,2(tk−1))
(t). (58)
Lemma 2. The following inequality holds true, for k = 1, . . . , n,
E1(‖X1(tk)− S2k(tk)‖2|F1tk−1) ≤ ‖X1(tk−1)−Y ♮,2(tk−1)‖2(1 + β(tk − tk−1))
+ (4δ2 + ǫ(tk − tk−1)) · (tk − tk−1).
Proof. Notice (see (43)) that, for t ∈ [tk−1, tk], the control of the second player is a
random variable equal to
v¯k , v♮(tk−1, X
1(tk−1),Y ♮,2(tk−1)). (59)
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By construction, v¯k is a measurable w.r.t. F1tk−1 . Denote u˜(t) , u1X1(·)(t). By
Definition 3, the following equality holds P 1-a.s.
d
dt
X1(t) = f1(t, X
1(t), u˜(t)) + f2(t, X
1(t), v¯k). (60)
Denote
u¯k , u
♮(tk−1, X
1(tk−1),Y ♮,2(tk−1)). (61)
Analogously, for t ∈ [tk−1, tk], put
νk(t) , ν
tk−1,tk
Y♮,2(tk−1),u♮(tk−1,X1(tk−1),Y♮,2(tk−1))
(t). (62)
By Condition (C) we have that, for any φ ∈ D,
φ(S2k(t))−
∫ t
tk−1
∫
V
Λτ [u¯k, v]φ(S2k(τ))νk(τ, dv)dτ (63)
is {F1t }t∈[tk−1,tk]-martingale.
We have that
‖X1(t)−X1(tk−1)‖ ≤M(t− tk−1) P 1-a.s. (64)
Further, using conditions (L5), (L8), one can prove that
E
1(‖S2k(t)− S2k(tk−1)‖2|F1tk−1) ≤ δ2(t− tk−1) + α˜(t− tk−1) · (t− tk−1). (65)
Here α˜(·) is defined by (38). The proof of this statement is analogous to the proof
of [3, Lemma 13].
In the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1, inequalities (64), (65), equality (60)
and the facts that (63) is {F1t }t∈[tk−1,tk]-martingales for φ(x) = 〈a, x〉 and for φ(x) =
‖x− a‖2 yield the estimate
E
∗(‖X1(tk)− S2k(tk)‖2|F1tk−1)
≤ ‖X1(tk−1)− Y ♮,2(tk−1)‖2(1 + 4(tk − tk−1)) + 2δ2(tk − tk−1)
+2E1
(∫ tk
tk−1
〈f(tk−1, X1(tk−1), u˜(t), v¯k), X∗(tk−1)− Y ♮,2(tk−1)〉dt
∣∣∣F1tk−1)
−2E∗
(∫ tk
tk−1
∫
V
〈g(tk−1,Y ♮,2(tk−1), u¯k, v),
X∗(tk−1)− Y ♮,2k (tk−1)〉νk(t, dv)dt
∣∣∣F1tk−1)
+ǫ(tk − tk−1) · (tk − tk−1).
(66)
In (66) we use the equality Y ♮,2(tk−1) = S2k(tk−1).
Using (37), (36), (59), (61) and conditions (L6), (L8), we obtain the following
inequality, for any v ∈ V :
〈f(tk−1, X1(tk−1), u˜(t), v¯k)− g(tk−1,Y ♮,2k (tk−1), u¯k, v), X∗(tk−1)− Y ♮,2k (tk−1)〉
≤
(
K +
1
2
)
‖X∗(tk−1)− Y 0(tk−1)‖2 + δ2.
This and (66) imply the statement of the lemma.
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Let Θ be a stopping time taking values in {t0, . . . , tn} defined by the rule: Θ =
tl−1, if
E1(‖X1(tj)− Y 0(tj)‖|F1tj−1)
≤ ‖X1(tj−1)− Y 0(tj−1)‖2(1 + β(tj − tj−1))
+ (4δ2 + ǫ(tj − tj−1)) · (tj − tj−1)
(67)
is fulfilled for all j = 1, . . . , l − 1 and violates for j = l. If (67) is valid for all
j = 1, . . . , n, then assume that Θ = tn.
From (40), (41), (57) it follows that, given k = 1, . . . , n, and t ∈ [tk−1, tk],
Y ♮,2(t) =
{
Y 0(t), tk−1 < Θ,
S2k(t), tk−1 ≥ Θ. (68)
This, (42), Lemma 2 and equality X1(t0) = Y ♮,2k (t0) = x0 P 1-a.s. give the following.
Corollary 2. For any k = 1, . . . , n,
E1(‖X1(tk)−Y ♮,2(tk)‖2|F∗tk−1) ≤ ‖X1(tk−1)−Y ♮,2(tk−1)‖2(1 + β(tk − tk−1))
+ (4δ2 + ǫ(tk − tk−1)) · (tk − tk−1).
Moreover,
E1‖X1(T )−Y ♮,2(T )‖ ≤ 4δ2TeβT + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT .
8 Proof of the main result
In this section we prove that the strategy w∗ defined in Section 6 is an approxi-
mate public-signal correlated equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, let us assume that the players use the profile of strate-
gies w∗. Let X∗, P ∗ be generated by w∗ and initial position (t0, x0). Recall that Y
0
is the stochastic process defined by (41).
For t ∈ [tk−1, tk), let η0(t) be equal to η0k(t). Part (i) of Condition (C) implies
that, for i = 1, 2,
ci(tk, Y
0(tk)) +
∫ tk
t0
∫
U×V
hi(t, Y
0(t), u, v)η0(t, d(u, v))dt
is a {F∗tk}nk=0-martingale. Using this and the boundary condition, we get that
ci(t0, x0) = E
∗
[
γi(Y
0(T )) +
∫ T
t0
∫
U×V
hi(t, Y
0(t), u, v)η0(t, d(u, v))dt
]
. (69)
The Lipschitz continuity of the functions γi, Corollary 2, and Jensen’s inequality
imply
E
∗|γi(X∗(T ))− γi(Y 0(T ))| ≤ RE∗‖X∗(T )− Y 0(T )‖
≤ R
√
E∗‖X∗(T )− Y 0(T )‖2 ≤ R
√
C2δ2 + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT . (70)
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Here the constant C is defined by (8).
Since |hi(t, x, u, v)| ≤ δ, using (69), (70) and Jensen’s inequality, we get
|E∗γi(X∗(T ))− ci(t0, x0)|
≤ E∗
∣∣∣∣γi(X∗(T ))− γi(Y 0(T ))− ∫ T
t0
∫
U×V
hi(t, Y
0(t), u, v)η0(t, d(u, v))dt
∣∣∣∣
≤ R
√
C2δ2 + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT + Tδ. (71)
Now assume that the first player deviates. Let w1 be an unilateral deviation of
the first player, X1, P 1 be generated by w1 and initial position (t0, x0). Recall that
Y ♮,2 and S2k are defined by (57), (58) respectively. Let us introduce the generalized
control η2k on [tk−1, tk) by the rule:
η2k(t, d(u, v)) ,
{
η0k(t, d(u, v)), tk−1 < Θ,
δu¯k ⊗ νk(t, dv), tk−1 ≥ Θ. (72)
Here η0k, u¯k and νk are defined by (44), (61) and (62) respectively. Recall that the
stopping time Θ is equal to tl−1 when (67) holds true for all j = 0, . . . , l − 1 and
violates for j = l. Finally, define the control η2 as follows: if t ∈ [tk−1, tk], then
η2(t) , η2k(t).
We claim that
c1(tk,Y ♮,2(tk)) +
∫ tk
t0
∫
U×V
h1(t,Y ♮,2(t), u, v)η2(t, d(u, v))dt (73)
is a {F1tk}nk=0-supermartingale w.r.t. P 1. Indeed, it suffices to prove that
E
1
[(
c1(tk,Y ♮,2(tk)) +
∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
h1(t,Y ♮,2(t), u, v)η2(t, d(u, v))dt
)∣∣∣F1tk−1]
≤ c1(tk−1,Y ♮,2(tk−1)). (74)
Using (68) and (72), we conclude that
E
1
[(
c1(tk,Y ♮,2(tk)) +
tk∫
tk−1
∫
U×V
h1(t,Y ♮,2(t), u, v)η2(t, d(u, v))dt
)∣∣∣F1tk−1]
= E1
[(
c1(tk,Y ♮,2(tk)) +
∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
h1(t,Y ♮,2(t), u, v)η2(t, d(u, v))dt
)
1tk−1<Θ
∣∣∣F1tk−1]
+ E1
[(
c1(tk,Y ♮,2(tk)) +
∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
h1(t,Y ♮,2(t), u, v)η2(t, d(u, v))dt
)
1tk−1≥Θ
∣∣∣F1tk−1]
= E1
[(
c1(tk, Y
0(tk)) +
∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
h1(t, Y
0(t), u, v)η0k(t, d(u, v))dt
)
1tk−1<Θ
∣∣F1tk−1]
+ E1
[(
c1(tk,S2k(tk)) +
∫ tk
tk−1
∫
V
h1(t,S2k(t), u¯k, v)νk(t, dv)dt
)
1tk−1≥Θ
∣∣∣F1tk−1].
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Part (i) of Condition (C) and definitions of Y 0 (see (41)) and η0k (see (44)) yield that
E
1
[(
c1(tk, Y
0(tk)) +
∫ tk
tk−1
∫
U×V
h1(t, Y
0(t), u, v)η0k(t, d(u, v))dt
)
1tk−1<Θ
∣∣∣F1tk−1]
= c1(tk−1, Y
0(tk−1))1tk−1<Θ = c1(tk−1,Y ♮,2(tk−1))1tk−1<Θ.
Further, using part (iii) of Condition (C), definitions of S2k (see (58)) and νk (see
(62)), we get
E
1
[(
c1(tk,S2k(tk)) +
∫ tk
tk−1
∫
V
h1(t,S2k(t), u¯k, v)νk(t, dv)dt
)
1tk−1≥Θ
∣∣∣F1tk−1]
≤ c1(tk−1,Y ♮,2(tk−1))1tk−1≥Θ.
Thus, (74) is fulfilled. It implies that the discrete time process (73) is a {F1tk}nk=0-
supermartingale. Therefore, using boundary condition, we get
E
1
(
γ1(Y ♮,2(T )) +
∫ T
t0
∫
U×V
h1(t,Y ♮,2(t), u, v)η2(t, d(u, v))dt
)
≤ c1(t0, x0). (75)
By Jensen’s inequality, the Lipschitz continuity of the function γ1 and Corollary 2
we have
E
1γ1(X
1(T ))− E1γ1(Y ♮,2(T )) ≤ E1|γ1(X1(T ))− γ1(Y ♮,2(T ))|
≤ RE1‖X1(T )− Y ♮,2(T )‖ ≤ R
√
C2δ2 + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT .
This, the fact that (73) is a supermartingale and the estimate |h1(t, x, u, v)| ≤ δ (see
(L8)) imply that
E
1γ1(X
1(T )) ≤ c1(t0, x0) +R
√
C2δ2 + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT + Tδ. (76)
In the same way one can consider the case when the second player deviates. If
w
2 = (Ω2,F2, {F2}t∈[t0,T ], u2x(·), v2x(·), P 2x(·)) is an unilateral deviation of the second
player, X2 and P 2 are generated by w2 and initial position (t0, x0), then
E
2γ2(X
2(T )) ≤ c2(t0, x0) +R
√
C2δ2 + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT + Tδ. (77)
The proof of this property relies on analogs of Lemma 2 and Corollary 2.
Inequalities (71), (76) and (77) imply that w∗ is a public-signal correlated ε-
equilibrium for any ε such that
ε ≥ R
√
C2δ2 + ǫ(d(∆))TeβT + Tδ.
Since we can construct the profile of strategies w∗ using a partition ∆ with an
arbitrary small fineness, the statement of Theorem 1 holds true.
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